Country-by-country disclosure of law enforcement assistance demands

As explained earlier in this report, Vodafone’s global business consists largely of a group of separate subsidiary companies, each of which operates under the terms of a licence or other authorisation issued by the government of the country in which the subsidiary is located, and each of which is subject to the domestic laws of that country.

In this section of the report, we provide a country-by-country insight into the nature of the local legal regime governing law enforcement assistance, together with an indication of the volume of each country’s agency and authority demands wherever that information is available and publication is not prohibited. In addition, a summary of some of the most relevant legal powers in each of our countries of operation can be found in our legal Annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

As we explain earlier in this report, this has been a difficult section to compile. There is no established model to follow: few international communications operators have published a country-by-country report of this kind and very few have done so on the basis of data gathered by the local licensed communications operator. Additionally, there are no standardised methods for categorising the type and volume of agency and authority demands; different governments, parliaments, regulators, agencies and authorities apply a variety of definitions when authorising or recording the types of demands outlined earlier in this report, as do operators themselves when receiving and recording those demands.

The need for governments to balance their duty to protect the state and its citizens against their duty to protect individual privacy is now the focus of a significant global public debate. We hope that – despite the shortcomings described above – the country-by-country disclosures in this report will help inform that debate.

How we prepared this report

Each of our local operating businesses has a nominated Disclosure Officer responsible for the management and administration of law enforcement assistance in response to a demand. The information collated and published here (wherever available and wherever publication has not been prohibited) has been overseen by the relevant Disclosure Officer. As explained earlier in this report, only local Vodafone employees with a high level of government security clearance will ever be made aware of specific lawful demands issued by agencies and authorities, and even then they will not typically be made aware of the context of any demand. It is therefore not possible for the external assurers for the Vodafone Group Sustainability Report, EY, to provide any form of independent verification over this section of the report. However, the integrity and operation of our law enforcement disclosure systems are subject to verification under Vodafone’s own internal audit controls.

For the two categories of agency and authority demand reported here – lawful interception and communications data (as explained earlier in this report) – we have robust processes in place to manage and track each demand and to gather statistical information on aggregate volumes.

It should be noted that, whilst the statistics for communications data demands are overwhelmingly related to communications metadata, the statistics we report also include demands for other types of customer data such as name, physical address and services subscribed. Our reporting systems do not necessarily distinguish between the types of data contained in a demand, and in some countries a single demand can cover several different types of data.

We have also conducted a global internal review to analyse, on a country-by-country basis, the extent to which we can lawfully publish aggregate volumes of law enforcement assistance demands at a local level. That review involved Vodafone’s senior local legal counsel in each of the 29 countries covered here.

Additionally, we instructed the international law firm, Hogan Lovells1, to support us in reviewing and verifying the legal opinions received from each of our operating country businesses. Hogan Lovells coordinated this work through its network of local law firms across Vodafone’s countries of operation, with each firm selected for its expertise in the areas of law relevant to this report. Hogan Lovells subsequently supported Vodafone in creating a legal report for each country (extracts of which are published below, where relevant), and the legal Annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB) also sets out a more detailed overview of some of the most important legal powers in each country.

In many countries, there is a lack of legal clarity regarding disclosure of the aggregate number of law enforcement demands. We have therefore contacted governments to ask for guidance. Some have responded, and their views are summarised in this report. Others have simply declined to reply to our enquiries altogether or have been reluctant to provide an indication of their perspectives. In a small number of countries where the government does publish statistics but where there are concerns regarding the methodology used in recording and/or reporting this information, we summarise the measures underway to enhance transparency in future. Further information about our approach under those circumstances are set out earlier in this report. Finally, in countries experiencing periods of significant political tension, it has proven to be challenging to ask any questions related to national security and criminal investigation matters without potentially putting Vodafone employees at risk of harassment or some form of sanction.

Explanation of the information presented

In each country and for each of the two categories of law enforcement demands issued, there are a number of different outcomes arising from our enquiries.

Wherever there are no restrictions preventing publication and there are no alternative sources of information indicating total demand volumes across all operators in the country as a whole, we have published the data available from our own local operating business indicating the cumulative number of demands received by Vodafone during the period under review. However, note our concerns about the shortcomings inherent to this approach, as explained earlier in this report.

There are six circumstances under which we have not published Vodafone’s own statistical information for a specific country, as set out below.

  1. Vodafone disclosure unlawful

    The law prohibits disclosure of the aggregate demand information held by Vodafone as well as any disclosure related to the mechanisms used to enable agency and authority access, as explained earlier in this report. This is particularly the case in matters related to national security. Wherever this is the case, we cite the relevant law that restricts us from disclosure, either in the main text or in the Annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).
  2. No technical implementation of lawful interception

    In some countries, there is no legal provision for implementation or we have not been required to implement the technical requirements necessary to enable lawful interception and therefore have not received any agency or authority demands for lawful interception assistance. This includes circumstances under which lawful interception powers exist under the law but the technical arrangements to conduct this have not been mandated.
  3. Awaiting guidance

    The law on disclosure is unclear, and we are still awaiting guidance from the government or a relevant agency or authority as to whether or not we can disclose this information.
  4. Unable to obtain guidance

    The law on disclosure is unclear and we have been unable to engage with the government or a relevant agency or authority to discuss options for publication during a period of political tension and consequent risk to our employees.
  5. Cannot publish

    Although local laws do not expressly prohibit disclosure, the authorities have told us directly that we cannot disclose this information.
  6. Government publishes

    In a number of countries, the government, parliament or a credible independent body such as a regulator already publishes statistical information for certain types of demand issued to all operators in that country. Wherever this is the case, we provide a link to the information available online. In some countries – and where relevant – we also provide additional commentary on the status of that third-party information. Our views on disclosure of relevant information by governments rather than by operators are summarised earlier in this report.

Notes:

  1. Vodafone are grateful to Hogan Lovells for its assistance in collating the legal advice underpinning this report including the country-by-country legal annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB). However, in doing so, Hogan Lovells has acted solely as legal adviser to Vodafone. This report may not be relied upon as legal advice by any other person, and neither Vodafone nor Hogan Lovells accept any responsibility or liability (whether arising in tort (including negligence), contract or otherwise) to any other person in relation to this report or its contents or any reliance which any other person may place upon it.

Country-by-country disclosure

The following tables offer a country-by-country insight into the nature of the local legal regime governing law enforcement assistance, together with an indication of the volume of each country’s agency and authority demands, wherever that information is available and publication is not prohibited. Links are provided to the individual government reports that are referenced in many of the country tables below. A summary of the relevant legislation, on a country-by-country basis, can be found in the legal annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

Albania 

Albania

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics Vodafone disclosure unlawful (1) 5,778 (2)
Key Note (1) It is unlawful to disclose any aspect of how lawful interception is conducted.
Key Note (2) The legal position is unclear regarding whether or not it would be lawful for Vodafone to disclose statistics related to agency and authority communications data demands. We asked the authorities for guidance and have been informed that we can disclose this information.
  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

Australia 

Australia

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics Government publishes (1)
Further action to follow (2)
Government publishes (1)
Further action to follow (2)
Key Note (1) The Australian Communications and Media Authority (pdf, 8 MB) and the Australian Attorney General’s Department publish statistical information related to lawful interception and communications data demands issued by agencies and authorities.
Key Note (2) During the course of preparing this report, another local operator published information relating to some of the statistical data it holds for its own operations. We have approached the Attorney General’s Department to work with industry and government on a common methodology to be followed in the recording and disclosure of this information. We will update this section of the report in future once we have further information as a consequence of that process.
  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

Belgium 

Belgium

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics No technical implementation (1) 2
Key Note (1) We have not implemented the technical requirements necessary to enable lawful interception and therefore have not received any agency or authority demands for lawful interception assistance.
  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

Czech Republic 

Czech Republic

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics 7,677 Government publishes (1)
Key Note (1) The Czech Telecommunications Office publishes statistical information related to communications data demands issued by agencies and authorities.
  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

Democratic Republic of the Congo 

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics No technical implementation (1) 436
Key Note (1) We have not implemented the technical requirements necessary to enable lawful interception and therefore have not received any agency or authority demands for lawful interception assistance.
  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

Egypt 

Egypt

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics Vodafone disclosure unlawful (1) Vodafone disclosure unlawful (1)
Key Note (1) Whilst the precise legal position regarding disclosure of aggregate statistical information is unclear, local criminal laws contain a large number of provisions prohibiting the disclosure of national security-related material and other matters related to law enforcement. The disclosure of statistical information related to agency and authority demands is therefore very likely to be considered to be a violation of such provisions.
  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

Fiji 

Fiji

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics No technical implementation (1) 760
Key Note (1) We have not implemented the technical requirements necessary to enable lawful interception and therefore have not received any agency or authority demands for lawful interception assistance.
  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

France 

France

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics No technical implementation (1) 3
Key Note (1) We have not implemented the technical requirements necessary to enable lawful interception and therefore have not received any agency or authority demands for lawful interception assistance.
  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

Germany 

Germany

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics Government publishes (1)
Further action to follow (2)
Government publishes (1)
Further action to follow (2)
Key Note (1)

The German Federal Office of Justice (pdf, 16.9 KB) publishes annual statistics related to agency and authority lawful interception demands.

The German Federal Office of Justice (pdf, 10.1 KB) publishes annual statistics related to agency and authority demands for access to communications data.

In its annual report, the Federal Network Agency ( Bundesnetzagentur (pdf, 7.24 MB)) publishes statistics related to access by the Regulatory Authority to communications data stored in accordance with Article 112 of the German Telecommunications Act (TKG).

Key Note (2)

The legal position is unclear regarding whether or not it would be lawful for Vodafone to disclose statistics related to agency and authority lawful interception and communications data demands.

Section 113(4) of the German Telecommunications Act (TKG) outlines that communication service providers must not disclose the fact that there was a request for information or that they provided such information to the concerned person or third parties. Section 15(2) of the Telecommunications Interception Ordinance (TKÜV) prohibits the operator of a telecommunication system from disclosing information related to lawful interception, the number of present or past lawful interceptions, as well as the time periods in which lawful interception measures were conducted. Although there is no legal precedent, the confidentiality obligation in Section 113(4) TKG could be interpreted by German courts or authorities to extend to a prohibition of the disclosure of aggregate demand statistics. If it is unlawful to disclose the existence of a single or particular demand for communications data, to disclose aggregate statistics would indicate that there have clearly been a number of such demands.

Given the lack of clarity in the law, we asked the authorities for guidance and were advised that we were not permitted to disclose any of the information we hold related to agency and authority demands for lawful interception and access to communications data. Subsequent to this, other operators in Germany began to publish information related to some of the law enforcement demands they have received and we understand that that publication may now be permissible.

However, we are concerned that the information disclosed to date may in fact act as a significant barrier to the kind of meaningful transparency necessary to maintain public trust in Germany. Whilst other operators appear to be following a methodology similar to that used by Vodafone Germany in recording statistics related to law enforcement demands (and indeed the demand volumes recorded for Vodafone Germany are closely comparable to those reported by other operators of a similar scale), other operators’ disclosures to date:

  • present only a partial view of law enforcement demands (for example, they exclude the effect of German agency and authority automated access systems which allow rapid and large-scale interrogation of a central database of customer records);
  • cannot be reconciled with the authorities’ publication of the number of warrants issued each year (with the potential for significant confusion as a result of wide variations in recording and reporting approaches, as explained earlier in this Report); and
  • remain potentially unlawful and therefore subject to prohibition in future, notwithstanding the authorities’ assurances received immediately prior to publication of this report.

We will therefore engage with other German operators and the German authorities to seek consensus on a more robust and consistent local disclosure framework in future. We will update this section of the report once we have further information as a consequence of that process.

  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

Ghana 

Ghana

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics No technical implementation (1) Awaiting guidance (2)
Key Note (1) We have not implemented the technical requirements necessary to enable lawful interception and therefore have not received any agency or authority demands for lawful interception assistance.
Key Note (2)

The legal position is unclear regarding whether or not it would be lawful for Vodafone to disclose statistics related to agency and authority communications data demands.

Under the Electronic Communications Act, 2008 (“ECA”), certain classes of information which are deemed to be of importance to the protection of national security may be declared to be critical electronic records and subject to restrictions in respect of access, transfer and disclosure. Under section 56 of the ECA, the Minister for Communications may by notice in the Gazette (the official government publication) declare certain classes of information which are deemed to be of importance to the protection of national security to be critical electronic records. Section 59 of the ECA therefore provides for the setting of minimum standards in respect of access to, transfer and control of a critical database.

Additionally, section 60 of the ECA imposes restrictions on the disclosure of information in a critical database to persons other than the employees of the National Information Technology Agency, a law enforcement agency, a ministry, department or other government agency. As a result, if the aggregate data in respect of the above agency and authority demands are designated as critical electronic records, the government will be able to prevent Vodafone from publishing them.

We have asked the authorities for guidance: however, we have not yet received a reply. We will update this section of the report in future if further information becomes available.

  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

Greece 

Greece

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics Government publishes (1) Government publishes (1)
Key Note (1) The Hellenic Authority for Communication Security and Privacy (ADAE) (pdf, 7.52 MB) publishes statistical information related to lawful interception and communications data demands issued by agencies and authorities.
  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

Hungary 

Hungary

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics Vodafone disclosure unlawful (1) 75,938 (2)
Key Note (1) It is unlawful to disclose any aspect of how lawful interception is conducted.
Key Note (2) Under s.62 of the National Security Service Act, if the intelligence services demand information from communications service providers, the service provider is not allowed to disclose any information (including aggregate data or statistics) in relation to such cooperation without the prior explicit permission of the competent minister or director general of the particular intelligence agency. The statistics disclosed here therefore do not include demands for access to communications data related to matters of national security.
  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

India 

India

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics Vodafone disclosure unlawful (1) Vodafone disclosure unlawful (1)
Key Note (1)

Section 5 (2) of the Indian Telegraph Act 1885 – read with rule 419 (A) of Indian Telegraph (Amendment) Rules 2007 obliges telecommunications service providers to “maintain extreme secrecy” in matters concerning lawful interception.

Further, under Rule 25(4) of the IT (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009 (Interception Rules) and Rule 11 of the IT (Procedure and Safeguards for Monitoring and Collecting Traffic Data or Information) Rules, 2009 (the ‘Traffic Data Rules’), “strict confidentiality shall be maintained” in respect of directions for lawful interception, monitoring, decryption or collection of data traffic. These prohibitions extend to the very existence of such directions, and could therefore authorise the government to prevent the publication of aggregate data relating to the number of directions received by the licensee.

In addition, in respect of lawful interception directions made under the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act) and its associated Rules, the government can prevent the publication of aggregate data in relation to lawful interception and other data disclosure demands from the government and law enforcement agencies. Finally, under Clause 40.5 of the Unified Access Service License (UASL: the licence governing access service in India), and Clause 33.5 of the Internet Service Provider (ISP) License (the licence governing internet access service in India), the licensee is bound to maintain the secrecy and confidentiality of any confidential information disclosed to the licensee for the proper implementation of the licences. Aggregate data regarding agency and authority demands come under the purview of these provisions.

  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

Ireland 

Ireland

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics Cannot disclose (1) 4,124
Key Note (1) Whilst local laws do not expressly prohibit disclosure, we asked the authorities for guidance and have been informed that we cannot disclose this information.
  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

Italy 

Italy

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics Government publishes (1) 605,601
Key Note (1) The Italian Ministry of Justice publishes statistics on the number of lawful interception demands issued by agencies and authorities.
  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

Kenya 

Kenya

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics No technical implementation (1) Unable to obtain guidance (2)
Key Note (1) Local operators are legally prohibited under s.31 of the Kenya Information & Communication Act from implementing the technical requirements necessary to enable lawful interception. We have therefore not received any agency or authority demands for lawful interception assistance.
Key Note (2)

The legal position is unclear regarding whether or not it would be lawful for Safaricom (Vodafone’s local associate operator) or Vodafone to disclose statistics related to agency and authority communications data demands.

Section 3 of the Official Secrets Act provides certain instances where publication or disclosure of information is deemed an offence. The broad language of this Act includes publication of data collected by the security agency in Kenya.

In addition, Section 37 of the National Intelligence Service Act (Act No. 28 of 2012) (“NIS Act”) limits a person’s constitutional right of access to information where such information is classified. When read with the Official Secrets Act (Cap. 187 Laws of Kenya), the government can prevent the publication of such data if such publication will be prejudicial to safety and the interest of the Republic of Kenya. The NIS Act defines “classified information” as information of a particular security classification, whose unauthorised disclosure would prejudice national security.While the NIS Act does not define what would be deemed to prejudice national security, the 2010 Constitution of Kenya provides how national security shall be promoted and guaranteed. A National Security Council exists to exercise supervisory control over national security matters in Kenya and to determine what may prejudice national security.

It is therefore under this umbrella (prejudice to national security) that the government can prevent the publication of various agency and authority demands. It may follow that where there is no prejudice to national security that these restrictions do not apply, albeit that what amounts to a prejudice to national security is legally undefined.

Under the current circumstances, we have concluded that it will not be possible to engage with government, agencies and authorities on these matters at this point. We will update this section of the report in future if circumstances change.

  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

Lesotho 

Lesotho

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics No technical implementation (1) 488
Key Note (1) We have not implemented the technical requirements necessary to enable lawful interception and therefore have not received any agency or authority demands for lawful interception assistance.
  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

Malta 

Malta

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics Vodafone disclosure unlawful (1) 3,773 (2)
Key Note (1) It is unlawful to disclose any aspect of how lawful interception is conducted.
Key Note (2) The legal position is unclear regarding whether or not it would be lawful for Vodafone to disclose statistics related to agency and authority communications data demands. We asked the authorities for guidance and have been informed that we can disclose this information.
  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

Mozambique 

Mozambique

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics No technical implementation (1) Unable to obtain guidance (2)
Key Note (1) We have not implemented the technical requirements necessary to enable lawful interception and therefore have not received any agency or authority demands for lawful interception assistance.
Key Note (2) The legal position is unclear regarding whether or not it would be lawful for Vodafone to disclose statistics related to agency and authority communications data demands. Under the current circumstances, it has not been possible to engage with the government on these matters. We will update this section of the report in future if further information becomes available.
  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

Netherlands 

Netherlands

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics Vodafone disclosure unlawful (1)
Government publishes (2)
Further action to follow (3)
Government publishes (2)
Further action to follow (3)
Key Note (1) Article 85 of the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 (‘Wet op de inlichtingen en veiligheidsdiensten 2002’ or ‘ISSA’), requires all persons involved in the execution of the ISSA to keep the data obtained confidential. It would be unlawful for Vodafone to disclose statistical information related to lawful interception demands issued by agencies and authorities under the ISSA.
Key Note (2)

The Dutch Ministry of Justice publishes statistical information related to lawful interception and communications data demands issued by agencies and authorities.

Key Note (3) As explained earlier in the report, we believe that the wide variations in methodology used by operators, governments and others in recording and reporting this statistical information amounts to a serious barrier to meaningful public transparency. We wrote to the Ministry of Security and Justice to urge further action by government in this area. In response, the Ministry outlined its aim to improve public transparency and committed to form a cross-functional working group – including Dutch operators – to consider options to increase the quality of public transparency. We will update this section of the report in future once we have further information as a consequence of that process.
  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

New Zealand 

New Zealand

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics Government publishes (1) Government publishes (1)
Key Note (1)

Statistical information related to lawful interception and communications data demands issued by agencies and authorities is published by the following four organisations:

The New Zealand Police (pdf, 3.31 MB)

The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (pdf, 343 KB)

The New Zealand Serious Fraud Office (pdf, 1.35 MB)

The New Zealand Customs Service (pdf, 1.45 MB)

  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

Portugal 

Portugal

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics Government publishes (1) 28,145 (2)
Key Note (1) The Portuguese Ministry of Internal Affairs publishes statistical information related to lawful interception demands issued by agencies and authorities.
Key Note (2) We asked the authorities for guidance and have been informed that we can disclose this information.
  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

Qatar 

Qatar

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics Vodafone disclosure unlawful (1) Cannot disclose (2)
Key Note (1) It is unlawful to disclose any aspect of how lawful interception is conducted.
Key Note (2)

The legal position is unclear regarding whether or not it would be lawful for Vodafone to disclose statistics related to agency and authority communications data demands.

Article 59 of the Qatar Telecommunication Law states that telecommunications service providers must comply with the requirements of the security authorities which relate to the dictates of maintaining national security and the directions of the governmental bodies in general emergency cases and must implement orders and instructions issued by the General Secretariat regarding the development of network or service functionality to meet such requirements. Any government department interested in “State security” can rely on Article 59 alongside use any enforcement powers vested directly in that government authority.

We asked the authorities for guidance and have been informed that we cannot disclose this information.

  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

Romania 

Romania

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics Vodafone disclosure unlawful (1) Awaiting guidance (2)
Key Note (1) It is unlawful to disclose any aspect of how lawful interception is conducted.
Key Note (2)

The legal position is unclear regarding whether or not it would be lawful for Vodafone to disclose statistics related to agency and authority communications data demands.

Article 142(3) and Article 152 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Law 135/2010) states that communication service providers are required to cooperate with criminal prosecution authorities with regard to lawful interception and the supply of retained communications data must keep the relevant operation a secret. Publishing aggregate statistics could potentially violate this obligation.

We have asked the authorities for guidance however, we have not yet received a reply. We will update this section of the report in future if further information becomes available.

  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

South Africa 

South Africa

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics Vodafone disclosure unlawful (1) Vodafone disclosure unlawful (1)
Key Note (1) Section 42 of the Regulation on Interception of Communication and Provision of Communication-related Information Act 2002 prohibits the disclosure of any information received pursuant to the Act. This includes, by virtue of Section 42(3), the disclosure of the fact that any demand for lawful interception or communications data has been issued under the Act. Accordingly, to publish aggregate statistics would be to disclose the existence of one or more lawful interception or communications data demands.
  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

Spain 

Spain

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics 24,212 (1) 48,679 (1)
Key Note (1) The legal position is unclear regarding whether or not it would be lawful for Vodafone to disclose statistics related to agency and authority lawful interception and communications data demands. We asked the authorities for guidance and have been informed that we can disclose this information.
  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

Tanzania 

Tanzania

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics No technical implementation (1) 98,765
Key Note (1) We have not implemented the technical requirements necessary to enable lawful interception and therefore have not received any agency or authority demands for lawful interception assistance.
  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

Turkey 

Turkey

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics Vodafone disclosure unlawful (1) Vodafone disclosure unlawful (1)
Key Note (1) It is unlawful to disclose any aspect of how lawful interception or access to communications data are conducted.
  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).

United Kingdom 

United Kingdom

Type of demand
  Lawful Interception Communications Data
Statistics Vodafone disclosure unlawful (1)
Government publishes (2)
Government publishes (2)
Key Note (1) Section 19 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 prohibits disclosing the existence of any lawful interception warrant and the existence of any requirement to provide assistance in relation to a warrant. This duty of secrecy extends to all matters relating to warranted lawful interception. Data relating to lawful interception warrants cannot be published. Accordingly, to publish aggregate statistics would be to disclose the existence of one or more lawful interception warrants.
Key Note (2) The Interception of Communications Commissioner's Office (pdf, 1.85 MB) publishes statistical information related to lawful interception and communications data demands issued by agencies and authorities.
  For a summary of the most important legal powers relating to law enforcement demands on a country-by-country basis, see our Law enforcement legal powers country-by-country annexe (pdf, 1.84 MB).